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Voting over Economic Plans 
By RICHARD T. BOYLAN AND RICHARD D. MCKELVEY* 
We review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in 
which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it 
is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then for any feasible 
consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Further- 
more, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them 
yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the 
optimal consumption plan for the median voter. (JEL D72, E61, E62, H43) 
This paper summarizes and provides intu- 
ition for a model of political choice over 
economic plans. The formal development of 
the model is reported elsewhere, in work 
together with John Ledyard (Boylan et al., 
1996). That work studies the consumption 
plans generated by a political process oper- 
ating in the temporal environment of a 
one-sector growth model. The model identi- 
fies conditions leading to "neoclassical" 
growth plans versus political business cycles, 
finding that length of commitment is an 
important variable. 
There is a long history of work in the 
economics literature on the problem of eco- 
nomic growth. The problem was originally 
formulated by Frank P. Ramsey (1928), was 
taken up again by Robert M. Solow (1956), 
and considered from the point of view of 
optimal economic policy by David Cass 
(1965), Tjalling C. Koopmans (1965), Lionel 
W. McKenzie (1976), and others. The initial 
work focused on the one-sector growth 
model, and the main results showed that, 
under sufficient convexity conditions on 
production and social preferences, there is 
a unique solution, which is characterized by 
the "turnpike" theorems.1 
While the problem of economic growth 
has received a lot of attention, very little 
has been done to incorporate political insti- 
tutions into such models. One exception is 
the work of Nathaniel Beck (1978), who 
studied political behavior in a continuous- 
time, one-sector model of economic growth, 
where voters differ only in their time prefer- 
ences. Beck shows that if the set of feasible 
plans is limited to consumption plans that 
are optimal for at least one voter, then the 
plan that is optimal for the voter with the 
mediai discount factor is a majority core. 
He conjectures that the median-voter plan 
is no longer a majority core if all plans are 
feasible. He also argues that the plan for 
the median voter is a "local equilibrium" in 
which no majority can agree on an instanta- 
neous deviation, assuming that the optimal 
plan for the median voter will be followed 
after that instant. *Olin School of Business, Washington University, Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, 
MO 63130, and Division of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, 
CA 91125, respectively. Support for this research was 
provided, in part, by NSF grant no. SES-9022932 to the 
California Institute of Technology. We are grateful for 
the comments of five referees. B. Douglas Bernheim 
pointed out that our results could be extended to 
supramajority rules, as in Proposition 1. The intuition 
suggested by a referee replaces the formal proofs that 
were originally in this paper. The original and more 
general results can now be found in a separate paper 
written together with John Ledyard (Boylan et al., 
1996). 
1The turnpike theorems imply that the consumption 
plan does not cycle. Periodic and chaotic dynamics 
have also been found to occur in the optimal solu- 
tion for the standard growth model when there are 
multiple sectors (see e.g., Michele Boldrin and Luigi 
Montrucchio, 1986; Raymond Deneckere and Steve 
Pelikan, 1986; Makul Majumdar and Tapan Mitra, 
1994; Kazuo Nishimura et al., 1994). 
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When one leaves the setting of growth 
theory, there is a fair amount of work that 
has attempted to characterize the type of 
fiscal and monetary policy that would be 
generated by political processes. A recur- 
rent theme in this literature is that, if 
politicians are allowed to make economic 
decisions, they will generate "political busi- 
ness cycles"-business cycles coinciding with 
the term of office of the politicians. William 
D. Nordhaus (1975) first derived such re- 
sults in a model in which the incumbent 
officeholder must choose among different 
points along a Phillips curve. He also pre- 
sented some empirical evidence supporting 
the existence of political business cycles in 
some countries.2 Nordhaus's theoretical ar- 
gument depends crucially on voter myopia. 
Subsequent papers by Kenneth Rogoff 
(1990) (see also Kenneth Rogoff and Anne 
Sibert [1988]) and Alberto Alesina (1987) 
have derived political business cycles with- 
out having to assume voter myopia. Rogoff 
(1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) show 
that the introduction of asymmetric infor- 
mation over the competency of political 
candidates can generate a political business 
cycle. In this model a business cycle emerges 
as a signaling equilibrium in which the size 
of the cycle is used by the candidate to 
signal competency to the voters. Alesina 
(1987) assumes that different political par- 
ties have different relative preferences over 
the trade-off between inflation and unem- 
ployment levels. He then gets political busi- 
ness cycles emerging even when voters have 
rational expectations, due to the fact that 
the election provides a random shock. Both 
of the above models are partial-equilibrium 
models. Rogoffs economy does not have the 
capability of real growth, while Alesina's 
political parties have exogenously given pol- 
icy positions. 
The Boylan et al. (1996) paper examines a 
discrete-time version of Beck's model: a 
one-sector growth model in which voters 
differ only in their time preferences, and in 
which they vote over the optimal plan. Un- 
like Beck's model, all plans, rather than just 
plans that are optimal for one voter, are 
available. 
We begin, in Section I, by introducing the 
details of the standard one-sector growth 
model and providing some background on 
optimal consumption plans for those not 
familiar with this framework. 
Section II considers the political stability 
of consumption plans if voters can choose 
between different plans to be followed. If 
all voters have different discount factors 
and the time horizon is at least three peri- 
ods, Beck's conjecture-that the median- 
voter plan is not a majority-rule core when 
plans that are not optimal for some voter 
are available-is true. In fact, a stronger 
result is true; namely, there is no majority- 
rule core if nonoptimal plans are feasible, 
and as long as the horizon is at least three 
periods, then any neoclassical optimal plan 
(a plan that could be optimal for a voter 
with time-consistent preferences) can be de- 
feated almost unanimously. 
Section III discusses the political stability 
of consumption plans when there are peri- 
odic decision points, such as elections, when 
policy can be committed for multiple peri- 
ods. If the plan is restricted to be stationary 
over every decision period, a minmax plan 
(a plan that can be defeated by the smallest 
majority) exhibits a "political business 
cycle." The cycles arise from coalitions be- 
tween patient and impatient voters. We 
compute an example which suggests that 
the shape of the cycles is different than 
predicted by previous theoretical work. In 
the example, the cycles yield postelection 
(rather than preelection) bursts in consump- 
tion to attract impatient voters, followed by 
long-term investment to attract patient vot- 
ers. 
In Section IV, we consider what con- 
sumption plans are chosen if it is impossible 
2Subsequent empirical evidence for cycles is mixed. 
Bennett McCallum (1978) and David G. Golden and 
James M. Poterba (1980) do not find evidence of 
business cycles in the United States. But other studies 
find evidence of cycles in other countries. Empirical 
evidence for cycles can be found in Martin Paldam 
(1979), Stuart D. Allen et al. (1986), Byung Hee Soh 
(1986), Manfred W. Keil (1988), Lawrence S. Davidson 
et al. (1990), David W. Findlay (1990), and Thomas F. 
Cargill and Michael M. Hutchinson (1991). 
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to commit credibly to multiperiod consump- 
tion plans, but possible instead just to com- 
mit one period at a time. In this case, voters 
select the consumption plan that is optimal 
for the voter with the median discount rate. 
In essence, Beck's intuition is correct in the 
discrete-time setting. 
It follows that political business cycles 
can arise in models that require no myopia 
or incomplete information and that the exis- 
tence and severity of political business cy- 
cles may be related to the length of the time 
horizon that the political system can com- 
mit.3 These results also raise questions as to 
whether neoclassical optimal plans are de- 
sirable from a welfare point of view, since 
they can always be defeated by virtually 
unanimous majorities. In particular, with fi- 
nite planning horizons, cyclical plans are 
majority-preferred to them and can be de- 
feated by smaller majorities. 
I. The Political-Economic Growth Model 
The simplest possible dynamic framework 
is used to model the economy: a one-sector 
growth model. The single good is a public 
good which can be consumed or invested. 
We first review the basic setup and re- 
sults of the one-sector growth model: let 
F: R + -> R + be a twice continuously differ- 
entiable concave production function with 
F(O)= O,F'(O)= +oo,F'(OO)= 0.4 Let kt be 
the per capita capital stock at the beginning 
of date t, let ct be the consumption per 
capita on date t, and let T E N U {oo} be the 
length of the time horizon. Given an initial 
capital k > 0, the technology can be summa- 
rized in the fundamental equation of growth 
theory: for t = 0, 1, 2,..., T, 
(1) ct + kt+1 = F(kt), 
where 
(2) ko=k kt 0 
ct > 0. 
Thus in each period, the output of produc- 
tion is divided between consumption and 
capital for use in next-period production. 
Any plan c = {c}0 I t I T which is a feasible 
solution to (1) and (2) is called a feasible 
consumption plan. Let C denote the set of 
feasible consumption plans. 
The one-sector growth model has been 
studied extensively in the case where a par- 
ticular social-welfare function is defined. 
The primary interest has been in solving 
for a feasible consumption plan that maxi- 
mizes the welfare function. In most cases 
the welfare function has been assumed to 
be temporally separable with impatience 
represented by a discount factor, 8. The 
problem to be solved is then 
T 
(3) max E 8tu(ct) 
ceC t=O 
where 8 E (0,1) and u: R+ -> R satisfies 
u'(c)>0, u'(0)=oo, and u"(c)<O. A neo- 
classical optimal plan is a solution to prob- 
lem (3) (for some 8). 
The solution to problem (3), {ct*}, is 
Markov; this means that there is a family of 
functions {gt(k; T)}, such that gt(k; T) is the 
consumption at time t, given the capital in 
the previous period. By equation (1), corre- 
sponding to any solution there is an optimal 
capital plan {kt*} and functions {h (k; T)} 
that express the optimal capital at time t as 
a function of capital at time t -1. For the 
infinite-horizon model, the solution can be 
expressed in terms of a single pair of func- 
tions h(k)=ht(k;oo) and g(k)=gt(k;oo). 
3In connection with this result, the findings of 
Paldam (1979) are quite intriguing. He studies 49 sta- 
ble governments in 17 OECD countries, finding signifi- 
cant business cycles in four-year governments, but no 
significant cycles in three-year governments. Thus, 
longer terms in office lead to less stable consumption 
plans. 
4The production function F(k) is frequently as- 
sumed to be of the form f(k) = f(k)+(1 - A)k, where 
A is the depreciation rate of capital stock, and f(k) is 
the net output. Hence, (1- A)k is the undepreciated 
capital. 
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Further, h satisfies: h'> 0 and h(k) < k* 
for k < k*, and h(k) > k* for k > k*. The 
steady-state level of capital, k*, is defined 
by F'(k*)= 1-/ V 
The above results imply that the optimal 
plan of capital begins at ko and converges 
monotonically to k*. Also, the optimal plan 
of consumption converges monotonically to 
c= F(k*)- k*. Similar results hold for the 
finite-horizon case. Here, one gets the so- 
called "turnpike" theorem: for any s > 0 
there is a T1 > 0 such that, if T > T7, then 
Ikt -*I> s for at most TL periods (see 
e.g., D. Gale, 1970). 
II. Political Stability of Economic Plans 
This section discusses the political stabil- 
ity of various consumption plans. There is a 
set NL of n voters who all have the same 
one-period utility for consumption but dif- 
fer in their time preferences. Voter i's util- 
ity function over consumption plans is 
U1(c) = ET=0 6itu(ct)q where u: R,+ -* R satis- 
fies u'(c) > 0, u'(0) = oo and u"(c) < 0 for all 
c Ec R+. We consider both the case of finite 
and infinite T. We will assume throughout 
that any two distinct voters have distinct 
discount factors. 
One might worry about the distribution of 
ct across voters, but we will treat this as a 
public good. That is, voters pick ct, the 
amount that each voter consumes, yielding 
voter i a utility level of u(c,) for that pe- 
riod. Most of the results we show in this 
paper extend to the case where the good is 
private with one-period utility functions 
being logarithmic. If the good is private, 
individuals will lend and borrow at the 
market-clearing interest rate, but in a model 
where government can influence such a rate, 
voters will have different preferences over 
government's actions (see Boylan, 1995). 
The first proposition, which is proved in 
Boylan et al. (1996), states that neoclassical 
optimal plans can always be defeated by 
large majorities. 
PROPOSITION 1: If T ? 2, then for any 
neoclassical optimal plan, c* E C, there is an 
alternative plan c E C, which defeats c* by at 
least n -1 votes. If c* is not optimal for any 
voter, then it can be defeated by n votes. The 
same result holds if we restrict the set of 
alternative plans to those that differ from c at 
no more than three consecutive periods. 
The above result may seem surprising at 
first glance. One might think that, when 
utility functions differ only by one parame- 
ter, the median voter theorem would apply, 
implying that the optimal plan for the voter 
with the median discount factor would be a 
majority core point. In fact, the optimal 
plan for the median-discount-factor voter is 
defeated by a plan supported by a coalition 
including patient and impatient voters. This 
plan has more consumption in earlier peri- 
ods (to satisfy the impatient voters), more 
consumption in later periods (to satisfy pa- 
tient voters), and less consumption in inter- 
mediate periods (to make the plan feasible). 
To illustrate this, we give an example show- 
ing how the optimal plan for the median 
voter can be defeated. 
Example 1: Assume the one-period utility is 
u(c) = ln(c) and the production function is 
F(k)= k1"2. There are three voters with 
discount factors 81 = 0.5, 82= 0.05, and 
83 = 0.95. Let c* and k* be the steady- 
state values of consumption and capital on 
the optimal plan for the voter with the 
median discount factor, namely, voter 1. As 
5To see this, let v* be a function satisfying 
v*(k) = max [u(c) + 8v*(F(k) - c)] 
c 
= max[u(F(k)-h)+ 8v*(h)]. 
h 
Then v*(k) = u(F(k)- h(k))+ 8v*(h(k)), where for all 
k, h(k) satisfies dv*/dh = 0, and consequently 
u'(F(k)- h(k)) = 8v'(h(k)). By the envelope theorem, 
V*'(k) = dv*/dk = u'(F(k) - h(k))F'(k). 
Hence, u'(F(k)- h(k)) = 5v*'(h(k)) =u'(F(h(k))- 
h(h(k)))F'(h(k)). This implies that u'(g(k))= 
8u'(g(h(k)))F'(h(k)). Note that if h(k)= k, then 
5u'(g(k))= u'(g(k))/F'(k) and F'(k)= 1/8. The 
value function, v*, is continuous, differentiable, strictly 
increasing, and strictly concave. For more details the 
reader can consult Milton Harris (1987). 
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discussed in Section I, F'(k*) = 2, so k*= 
0.0625 and c* = F(k*)- k* = 0.1875. For 
simplicity, we assume that initial capital is 
at the steady state, k*, so that the optimal 
plan is c* = (c*, c*, c*, ... ). Now consider the 
plan k, which changes the capital stock only 
at periods 1 and 2 to k1 = 0.0600, k2 = 
0.0675, and then returns to k*. This yields 
the consumption plan c = (co, c1, c2, c*, 
c*, c*, ... ), with co = 0.1900, cl = 0.1774, and 
C'2 = 0.1973. It is easily checked that this 
plan is feasible. Further, both voters 2 and 3 
prefer c to c*: U2(c)= -1.751+ S2U2(c*)> 
-1.762 + 2U2(c*) = U2(c*), and U3(c) = 
-4.768+ 86U3(c*)> -4.775+ 63U3(c*)= 
U3(c*). 
Figure 1 gives an intuition for Proposition 
1. Let c be a consumption plan that agrees 
with the optimal path for the median voter 
except at times 0, 1, and 2. The interior of 
the curve F and the axis describes the set of 
such consumption plans that are feasible. 
The consumption at times 0 (horizontal axis) 
and 2 (vertical axis) together with the fun- 
damental equation of growth theory, equa- 
tion (1), determine consumption in period 1, 
cl. This is summarized by a function cl = 
g(cO, c2). Thus, the curve F represents the 
set of points (cO, c2) such that g(cO, c2) = 0. 
The curve P represents the preferred 
choices of (cO, c2) for voters with different 
values of 6; each point on P corresponds to 
a different value of 6. Higher values of 8 
map to points that are further to the left on 
P. Let c* be the optimal choice for the 
median-discount-factor voter, m. The slope 
of the indifference curve of individual i # m 
through the point c* is 
dc2 
dCo UA(cO g(cO,c Cc2, )= Ui* 
1 u'(c*) + u'(cf* )go(co c) 
8 u'(c* 9)g2(CO*9 C2*,) + u '(C2*) 
where Ui* = Ui(c*, c* , ...) and gi = 
dg/dci. Since c* is optimal for the median 
voter, the first-order conditions must hold, 
namely, 
(5) u'(c*)+ Bmu'(cl)go(c*g,c*) =0 
u'(c.* )92(CO* I c2* ) + S.U'(C2* )=O. 
C2 
F 
p 
6> 
<  
C( 
FIGURE 1. ILLUSTRATION F PROPOSITION 1 
Notes: The axes measure the consumption at times 0 
and 2. Consumption after time 2 is fixed, while con- 
sumption at time 1 is computed as the residual. F is the 
frontier of the feasible set. A point on P represents the 
choice of (CO, C2) most preferred by a voter with some 
discount factor S. Points on P that are further north- 
west correspond to higher values of 6. The optimal 
consumption for the median discount factor is c*. The 
circles represent indifference curves of a patient indi- 
vidual (6 > Bm) and an impatient individual (6 < Bm). 
A small change in consumption in the direction of the 
arrow makes all individuals better off (except for the 
median voter). 
By combining (4) and (5), we get 
dc2 
dco UA(Co,g(CO,C2),C2 ...)= Ui* 
1 U'(C*1 go(Co* SC2*, 
U'(C2*) 
Note that dc2 /dco is larger for smaller S. 
Thus indifference curves cross as shown in 
Figure 1. Hence, a small deviation in the 
direction of the arrow shown on this figure 
makes everyone better off, except for the 
median-discount-factor voter. 
Given the result of Proposition 1, the 
natural question to ask is whether there are 
any plans that cannot be defeated by major- 
ity rule. Proposition 2, which is proved in 
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cti 
\F 
ci 
FIGURE 2. ILLUSTRATION FOR PROPOSITION 2 
Notes: On the axes we have the consumption at time t 
and t'. F is the set of feasible choices given fixed 
consumption in all other periods. The point R denotes 
a choice that is not optimal for the median voter. Two 
curves describe the indifference curves of the median 
voter (5m) and of a patient voter (6> am). A small 
change in the direction of the arrow is preferred by the 
median voter and all voters with higher discount fac- 
tors. 
Boylan et al. (1996), states that the answer 
is negative. 
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the time hori- 
zon, T, is at least 2 and the number of voters, 
n, is odd and greater than 2. Then, for any 
feasible consumption plan, c, there is an 
alternative feasible plan preferred to c by a 
majority of voters; in other words, there is no 
majority-rule core. 
Figure 2 gives an intuition for Proposition 
2. Suppose there is a plan, c', that cannot 
be defeated by majority rule. By Proposition 
1, there are two periods, t and t', with 
t > t', such that there is a feasible change in 
consumption during these two periods (leav- 
ing consumption in other periods fixed) that 
makes the median-discount-factor voter 
strictly better off. In Figure 2, F is the set of 
feasible choices (ct, CC). The point R de- 
notes the choice (c , C',). Given the choice 
of t and t', the indifference curve of the 
voter with the median discount factor must 
cross F at the point R. Suppose that this 
indifference curve is flatter than F, as drawn. 
Since higher values of 8 correspond to even 
flatter indifference curves, those curves must 
also intersect F. Thus, there is a majority of 
voters who prefer a small change in con- 
sumption in the direction of the arrow over 
c'. If the indifference curve of the median- 
discount-factor voter is steeper than F, then 
the conclusion follows by an analogous ar- 
gument. 
III. Political Stability with Periodic Elections 
The above results consider the political 
stability of long-term plans when it is possi- 
ble to offer any possible alternative to a 
given plan. In this section we assume that 
the political institution allows commitment 
of policy at most for a fixed term, say, the 
length of the term of office of a given ad- 
ministration, which we take to be L. One 
administration cannot commit the economic 
policy of the next administration, except 
insofar as its policy can determine the initial 
economic conditions of the following admin- 
istration. Thus, if we wish to characterize 
the kinds of policy that would emerge in 
political systems with periodic elections, we 
should be concerned with the stability of 
plans against L-period deviations. We want 
to find the plan for a T-period horizon that 
is maximally stable against attempts to 
amend it during periodic elections every L 
periods. 
To deal with this case, there are two 
problems to confront. The first involves what 
voters conjecture will happen in the future, 
after the period to which they are commit- 
ting, if they end up delivering a different 
initial capital stock for the future. The sec- 
ond is what policy to assume is selected for 
the L periods of commitment in the ab- 
sence of an equilibrium. 
Regarding the first problem, in order to 
deal formally with finite-length commitment 
one must specify expectations about what 
will happen after the period to which one 
can commit. The view we take here is that 
the problem at time jL is identical to the 
problem at time 0. The distribution of dis- 
count factors is the same at both points in 
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time. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the decision rule that is used at time jL is 
the same for all j. Hence, we look for 
L-period stationary policies, which are iden- 
tical functions of the underlying preferences 
at each decision point. 
Regarding the second problem, we al- 
ready know from Propositions 1 and 2 that 
in cases when T >2, neoclassical optimal 
plans can be beaten by large majorities, and 
there is no majority core among the set of 
feasible plans. Since these results only de- 
pend on perturbations of length 3, it is 
obvious that the same results will be true 
when perturbations can differ from the orig- 
inal plan for periods of length at least L = 3. 
So what do we assume candidates do in the 
absence of a majority core? 
In the absence of a majority core, one 
reasonable assumption is that candidates 
will choose a plan that is as "safe" as pos- 
sible. There are many ways of formulating 
such ideas in the social-choice literature. 
The one we adopt here is the idea of an 
a-majority set, the set of policies that can 
be defeated by at most a majority of size a, 
and the related idea of the minmax set, the 
set of policies that can be defeated by the 
smallest possible majority. Use of the min- 
max set would be justified if decisions must 
be made by supermajorities (e.g., because of 
the existence of political institutions such as 
bicameral legislatures and the executive 
veto). For a justification of the minmax set 
as the outcome of models of two-candidate 
competition, see Gerald H. Kramer (1980). 
As shown in Boylan et al. (1996), any 
policy in the minmax set maximizes a 
Samuelson-Bergson social-welfare function 
i N,AkiUi(c), where Ai > 0. Therefore, the 
consumption plan selected is optimal for a 
fictitious voter with preferences E, 8,u(c,), 
where a- Eie EKi. Notice that the dis- 
count factor ratio at / at- 1 is increasing in t; 
the more patient individuals have more 
weight in determining society trade-offs fur- 
ther out in time. Since preferences change 
over time, for any time periods s < t < u, 
the preferred time-u consumption, cu, at 
time s is different from the preferred cU at 
time t. The time inconsistency of prefer- 
ences was first pointed out by Robert H. 
Strotz (1956). For this reason, Bezalel Peleg 
and Menahem E. Yaari (1973) define equi- 
librium consumption plans as consumption 
plans such that an individual cannot change 
consumption at time t (while keeping con- 
sumption at every other time period the 
same) and be better off. 
In a growth model, the definition of equi- 
librium consumption plan has to be more 
complex, because a change in consumption 
in a particular period may make future con- 
sumption infeasible. In an equilibrium con- 
sumption plan, c, at the beginning of each 
policy period, t, 
L-1 
( Ct S ,ct+L -1 ) EE argmax : 5ku( Ck+t) 
k = O 
+ 8LV(kt+L) 
where V(kt+L) is the continuation value. A 
steady-state equilibrium consumption plan is a 
plan where for all t and a, kt =kt+aL' 
By the Euler equation, 
U'(c,) = (5t+1 /8t)u'(ct+1 )F'(kt+1 ) 
Since 8t+l /1t is increasing, it follows that 
ct cannot be constant. Formally, {kt}tLo ex- 
hibits a political business cycle if ko = kL $ k, 
for some 0 <t <L. 
PROPOSITION 3: Any steady-state equilib- 
rium consumption plan yields a political busi- 
ness cycle. 
More details regarding the proof, the def- 
inition of the continuation value, and the 
minmax set are provided in Boylan et al. 
(1996). In general, we do not know whether 
steady-state consumption plans exist. How- 
ever, computation for simple examples sug- 
gests that they do. We close with an exam- 
ple illustrating equilibrium consumption 
plans that converge to steady-state equi- 
libria. 
Example 2: In this example, we compute 
(up to computer accuracy) an equilibrium 
consumption plan for the case in which 
u(c) = ln(c) and F(k) = k, there are 100 
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FIGURE 3. SAMPLE QUILIBRIUM CONSUMPTION 
PLANS FROM EXAMPLE 2 
Note: The plan quickly converges to a steady state, 
which is a political business cycle according to Proposi- 
tion 3. 
voters with discount factors uniformly dis- 
tributed between 0.5 and 1.0, Ai = 1/100, 
and ko = 0.01. Figure 3 illustrates an equi- 
librium consumption plan for the cases when 
L = 3, 6, and 12. (The Appendix describes 
the algorithm that computes such a plan.) 
In each graph the top line is output 
[Yt = F(kt)], the center line is consumption 
[ct =F(kt)- kt+1I, and the bottom line is 
gross investment [t = kt1- kt. We note 
that the political business cycles have the 
feature that output and consumption peak 
at the beginning and end of the electoral 
term, while investment peaks in the middle 
of the term. Also we note that the ampli- 
tude of the cyclical behavior increases as 
the length of the term increases. 
IV. One-Period Commitment 
The results in the previous sections show 
that, if voters can choose between multi- 
period proposals, no majority-rule core 
exists. However, it can be argued that 
multiple-period commitments are not credi- 
ble. Because of the temporal nature of the 
decision, period-t decisions must be imple- 
mented before period-(t + 1) decisions. But 
once period-t decisions are implemented, 
there is always the opportunity to revise the 
period-(t + 1) decisions. In making the pe- 
riod-t decision, all voters would realize this 
aspect of the problem, and they would make 
the period-t decision conditional on the be- 
lief that the period-(t + 1) decision will be 
made subject to preferences at that point in 
time. This means that multiperiod devia- 
tions from a proposed "status quo" con- 
sumption plan can only occur if players will 
want to continue with the deviation even in 
the later periods of the deviation. For exam- 
ple, if a coalition supporting a deviation 
contains members with both high and low 
discount factors, then for the deviation to 
benefit both groups, it may be necessary 
that the groups get their benefits at differ- 
ent times. Once the players with low dis- 
count factors have received their benefits 
from higher initial levels of consumption, 
they may no longer be willing to support the 
investment necessary to help their coalition 
partners with higher discount factors. Of 
course, if the coalition members had real- 
ized this problem when they were contem- 
plating the proposed change, they would 
never have formed the coalition in the first 
place. This realization by the individuals 
that coalition members may want to back 
out of their agreements later in the process 
will make it harder to find proposals that 
can beat the status quo. 
The ideas discussed in the previous para- 
graph are formalized by the concept of 
subgame perfection; that is, the voting equi- 
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FIGURE 4. ILLUSTRATION FOR PROPOSITION 4 
Notes: On the axes, we have the consumption at a 
given period and capital at the next period. F is the 
feasible set. A is the optimal choice of the median 
voter. Any movement away from A can be defeated by 
a majority. 
librium must be an equilibrium at every 
time period. In other words, no precommit- 
ment is possible. However, it is not straight- 
forward to formalize this intuition. In order 
to define the notion of subgame perfection, 
a specific noncooperative game needs to be 
defined. Such a game needs to specify ex- 
actly how voters make decisions and exactly 
what type of information the participants 
in the decision-making process have. 
In Boylan et al. (1996), a model of two- 
candidate competition in which both voters 
and candidates behave strategically is de- 
fined. In this model, at each period candi- 
dates simultaneously precommit to con- 
sumption for that time period. Voters then 
simultaneously vote for one of the candi- 
dates. The candidate with the most votes is 
elected and implements the announced con- 
sumption. Candidates do not care about 
what consumption they select, but only care 
about being elected. Voters do not care 
about which candidate is elected, but only 
care about their consumption stream. Given 
such a model, it is shown in our work with 
John Ledyard (Boylan et al., 1996) that a 
voting equilibrium can be defined which 
satisfies the following property. 
PROPOSITION 4: The optimal consump- 
tion plan for the median voter is a voting 
equilibrium. If the time horizon, T, is finite, 
then it is the unique equilibrium. 
In this discussion we do not present the 
definition of the game, but instead focus on 
the properties of such a "voting equilib- 
rium." Let {c*T(k)} be the optimal plan for 
the median voter, given an initial capital k 
and a length of the time horizon T. We 
want to provide intuition for why {c T(k)} is 
a voting equilibrium. Here we restrict our- 
selves to Markov plans, so at time t, voters 
have a utility that depends on only the cur- 
rent consumption, c, and capital in the next 
period, k; specifically, utility of an individ- 
ual with discount factor 8 is u(c) + vtT(k, 8), 
where vtT(k, 8) = E S Su(cs* T-t(k)).6 By 
monotonicity of cs* T-t(k) (which is proved 
in Boylan et al. t1996]), if 8 > 8', then 
d vtT/ dk(k, ) > d vtT/ dk(k, 8 '). 
Figure 4 illustrates the decision in a par- 
ticular time period and for a particular level 
of capital. F is the graph of capital level in 
next period, k, as a function of current 
consumption c (specifically, k = F(k - c), 
where k is the current level of capital). 
Point A denotes the optimal choice for the 
median-discount-factor voter. Hence, at 
point A, the indifference curve labeled 8m 
is tangent to the feasible set. By the mono- 
tonicity of dvtTl/k, the indifference curves 
for voters with 8 > am must be "flatter," 
and indifference curves for voters with 8 < 
8m must be "steeper." Thus, A defeats any 
feasible point to the left of A by a majority 
of voters (the median voter and those less 
patient than the median voter), and A also 
defeats any feasible point to the right of A 
by a majority of voters (the median voter 
and those more patient than the median 
voter). 
Suppose that, after time t, voters select 
the continuation path that is optimal for the 
6For the infinite-horizon model the notation simpli- 
fies: utility of an individual with discount factor 8 is 
u(c) + v(k, 8 ), where v(k, 8 ) = Es=1 5su(c* (k)). 
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median voter. Then, the argument in the 
previous paragraph shows that at time t 
voters select the consumption level that is 
optimal for the median voter. Consequently, 
the optimal consumption plan for the me- 
dian voter is a voting equilibrium. Suppose 
the time horizon is finite. In the last period 
there is a unique equilibrium, namely, con- 
sume everything. By the argument in the 
previous paragraph and by induction, at ev- 
ery time period, the continuation value is 
unique, and hence the equilibrium is unique. 
V. Conclusion 
The growth literature analyzes optimal 
policies and competitive outcomes from the 
point of view of a representative consumer. 
This paper discusses how the political pro- 
cess aggregates preferences of voters with 
different time preferences. The paper sug- 
gests that if there are large numbers of 
voters and there is either a finite planning 
horizon or periodic elections, the outcome 
of the political process will be different than 
the prediction given by the representative- 
agent model. These results are formally 
stated and proved in Boylan et al. (1996). 
In the case of periodic elections, steady- 
state equilibrium consumption plans behave 
like political business cycles. Unlike the 
model of Nordhaus (1975), the political 
business cycles are not caused by voter my- 
opia, but by how the majority relation ag- 
gregates preferences, and cyclic consump- 
tion plans would be selected even at the 
beginning of the term of office. Since the 
cycles arise because of coalitions between 
patient and impatient voters, they generate 
different patterns than other models of po- 
litical business cycles. Computations on sim- 
ple examples suggest that the cycles begin 
with a postelection (not preelection) burst 
of consumption to appeal to impatient vot- 
ers, followed by a period of reinvestment to 
appeal to patient voters. 
Our analysis also raises questions as to 
whether neoclassical optimal plans are de- 
sirable from a welfare point of view, since 
they can always be defeated by virtually 
unanimous majorities. In particular, cyclical 
plans are majority-preferred to them and, if 
the planning horizon is short, can only be 
defeated by smaller majorities than neoclas- 
sical optimal paths. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix describes how we com- 
puted the plans in Figure 3. Let at = 
(1/100)E?9 0[0.5 + i(O.5)(1/99)It. Let h = 
(hl,..., hL): R - L, represent the L-period 
policy function, where h,(k) represents the 
capital at the beginning of period t if k is 
the initial capital stock at time t = 0. For 
notational convenience, we write ho(k) = k. 
For any integer j, define hjL+ t(k)= 
ht(h (k)), and for any h, define 
00 
Vh(k)= E 8t+Lu(F(ht(k)) 
-ht+(k)) 
t = O 
For any h: RD4 R L, v: R -* R, and ke R, 
define 
L -1 
w(k;h,v)= E 8tu(F(ht(k)) 
t = O 
- ht+1(k)) + v(hL(k)). 
To compute a solution, we choose a grid 
on k (capital), and for any given L we 
proceed as follows: 
1. Start with an initial guess v(k) of vh(k) 
on the grid. 
2. Compute h(k)eargmaxhw(k;h,v) for 
each k on the grid. 
3. Set h(k) = h(k) on the grid. 
4. Compute D(k) = Vh(k) = Et=O08t+L X 
u(F(h t(k)) - h t + 1M). 
5. IfIb-vI< (inthee1 norm), stop. 
6. Otherwise, set v(k) = (k) and go to 2. 
We use as our grid H = {k = 0.002 x j: j an 
integer with 0 <? < 200}. We set T =150 
and r = 1.0x 10- ?. In all the examples we 
have tried, we find the above program con- 
verges (satisfies the condition in step 5 
above). 
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